The Copenhagen Accord: Global Governance, Chicago Style
ENVIRONMENT & HEALTH, SUSTAINABILITY
Wednesday, December 23, 2009
At last week's United Nations Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen, Denmark, President Barack Obama and the leaders of four other nations arbitrarily seized control of a two-year negotiating process among 193 UN member states to impose an ambiguous and open-ended climate change "accord."
Ironically, beyond its uncertain impact on long-term climate change policies, the manner in which the so-called Copenhagen Accord was negotiated-- hastily, without transparency, and without the participation of almost all of the relevant stakeholders-- exhibited a level of political hubris, strong-arming, and expediency that significantly challenges (or, at least, re-constitutes) the United Nations' nascent global governance ambitions. It also raises the question of whether the alleged Bush-era "cowboy" diplomacy, about which the leaders of so many countries had complained, has been replaced with an Obama-era "Chicago-style" politics that mocks long-standing diplomatic rules of engagement for the negotiation of international treaties.
Meanwhile, Republican leaders in the U.S. Senate anxiously consider the treaty-making implications of a Presidential administration willing to unilaterally propose an international agreement on global climate change without allowing for any international debate or prior input of U.S. Senators. Among other things, the Copenhagen Accord includes 1) the proposed creation by developed nations of an eventual $100 billion annual fund to help developing countries grow in a manner that minimizes carbon emissions and 2) the U.S. adoption of limits on carbon emissions that will significantly increase the costs of production and hinder economic growth. Thus, Republican Senators (and their constituents) have reason to be concerned about corresponding federal climate change legislation being imposed as a substitute for a formal treaty, which would require a two-thirds vote for passage.
For better (in the case of those opposed to UN global governance) or for worse (for those in favor of it), the entire process leading up to the convoluted adoption of the Copenhagen Accord by Brazil, China, India, South Africa, and the United States, of which the other Conference participants begrudgingly "took note," has revealed a litany of shortcomings.
First, the entire climate “change” movement (formerly the global “warming” movement, until it was discovered that, during the last decade, climate temperatures have cooled) is rooted in the idea of climate “justice.”
The climate justice movement, pushed by radical environmental non-governmental organizations, is based on a global wealth transfer regime rooted in three principles:
· The affluent, industrialized nations have emitted far more greenhouse gas emissions than developing nations, enabling a cheaper path to industrialization;
· Affluent nations therefore face the biggest responsibility and burden for action to address climate change; and
· Affluent nations therefore must help developing nations adapt to avoid the polluting (i.e. easier and cheaper) path to development, through financing and technology transfer, for example.
In essence, global justice advocates believe that developed nations need to pay “eco-reparations” to developing nations to make up for the “sins” associated with their past development.
The second shortcoming of the UN-led climate change movement is the poor quality and lack of transparency associated with the production of the scientific research that served as the basis for the various assessment reports on climate change produced by the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, a subject that garnished wide attention from the new media.
Third, many of the developing nations participating in the UN climate change negotiation process have unreasonable expectations regarding the degree to which developed nations would be willing to engage in a wealth and technology transfer of epic proportions in exchange for unproven and unverifiable efforts by developing countries to engage in “green” development.
Fourth, as a result of the current global economic downturn and likely taxpayer resistance, developed countries are in no position to bankroll the contemplated transfer of funds and technology.
Finally, in light of the historical inability of the United Nations to effectively administer large programs involving the transfer of goods and money (i.e., the Oil for Food scandal), it is unreasonable to believe that developed nations would trust the UN to implement any wealth transfer programs emanating from successful climate change negotiations.
In the end, there is much irony in the Copenhagen outcome. A Nobel Prize-winning American President, lauded by leaders from developing countries around the world as evidence of America's assumption of the mantle of global citizenship and its embrace of multi-lateral institutions to promote social transformations, "blows into and blows up" a painstaking, multi-year climate change negotiating process from which developing countries had expected to secure immediate financial benefits, technology transfers, and development advantages. Instead, Conference participants were left to merely "take note" of a non-binding "accord" that mostly re-hashed that which had already been decided and that served the primary purpose of enabling President Obama to fly back to Washington, DC in the face of its worst snow storm in history, comfortable in the knowledge that he would be able to represent to the American people that he had done his best to combat global warming.
Jim Kelly is the President of Solidarity Center for Law and Justice, P.C., a public interest civil and human rights law firm based in Atlanta, Georgia. The opinions expressed herein are his own.
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